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Abstract:
In this thesis, I examine how a crisis of masculinity in the former German Democratic
Republic has contributed to the rise of the far-right party, Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD). In
the first chapter, I argue that east German men feel left- behind politically, economically, and
demographically. In the second chapter, I compare results from the 2017 Federal Bundestag
election to demonstrate that east German men are more likely to vote for the AfD than any other
demographic group in Germany.
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Introduction:
In February 2020, the leader of the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and
Chancellor Angela’s Merkel successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, stepped down as party
leader as regional politics in the east German state of Thuringia sent shock waves throughout the
national political landscape.1 All of the major German political parties had entered a pact not to
cooperate with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), but the Thuringian CDU voted
with the AfD to elect the new governor of the state.2 With Kramp-Karrenbauer’s leadership
questioned, she had no option but to step down, and the growing power of the AfD was apparent.
While the AfD may never be the ruling party in Germany, the message is clear— they are here to
stay.
Far-right parties across Europe have achieved great electoral success in recent years.
Parties such as the National Front in France and the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria have been
mainstays in national and European politics respectively. However, the new far-right AfD has
been enjoying success in Germany- a country with little to no relevant far-right populist parties
since the end of the Second World War. The far-right has been on the rise in Germany since the
2017 Bundestag elections in which the right-wing Alternativ für Deustchland (AfD) won 12.6%
percent of the vote, becoming the leading opposition voice in the German Parliament. The AfD,
founded in 2013, has been successful in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR),
especially Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia. Twenty-eight percent of east German men voted
for the far right AfD showing that the key to the party’s growing success is influenced by the east

Katrin Bennhold, “Merkel’s Chosen Successor Steps Aside. The Far Right Cries Victory,” The New York
Times (February 10, 2020).
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German man’s attraction to the far-right party.3 In the 2019 European Parliament elections the
AfD finished no lower than second place in any of the five East German states (MecklenburgVorpommern, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Saxony) and received 11%
nationally in Germany.4
While much of the rise of the German far-right can be attributed to the 1 million asylum
seekers entering Germany in 2015, such anger has additional origins in the east. After German
Reunification in 1990, many east German women sought work in the west and never returned,
and west German elites took over powerful roles in east Germany. The changing demographic
imbalance in terms of male-female ratio, the economy, and lack of political voice has created a
situation in which east German men feel ignored and left-behind by western Germans, east
German women, and even the asylum seekers. They are unable to find meaningful relationships
or work, and they desire to be heard. The cause of AfD’s ascendance as a power player in
German politics lies beyond hatred for foreigners and Muslims. Why have east German men
voted disproportionately for the AfD, and how does the east German man’s view of masculinity
in post-reunification Germany shape this voting pattern? I argue that the AfD’s support stems
from a “forgotten” generation of east German men who see a country and its women that have
left them behind economically, politically and demographically, and created a crisis of
masculinity in the states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Even though AfD,
founded in 2013, originally served as a Eurosceptic party, the young party has evolved to appeal
to east German men.

Katrin Bennhold, “One Legacy of Merkel? Angry East German Men Fueling the Far Right,” The New
York Times (November 5, 2018).
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Literature Review:
The gap between male and female voters in support of populist right-wing parties in
Europe has been studied extensively. However, the reasons for such a gap have been debated.
Tim Immerzeel asserts that support for populist right-wing parties is due in large part to antiimmigrant attitudes.5 Pippa Norris argues that voters who have lower levels of trust in political
institutions tend to support right-wing parties.6 Another sentiment found in previous literature is
the tendency for young, less educated men to espouse ideas more in line with populist right-wing
beliefs because these men are often in direct competition for work with migrants and foreigners.7
Many of these findings can be applied to the East-German case and the AfD as Germany’s rightwing party finds its support base among undereducated and underemployed men who oppose
Chancellor Merkel’s decision to allow over 1 million migrants into the country in 2015.
Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove assert that the difference in socio-economic position
between males and females and anti-immigration and “law and order” attitudes can account for
the gap in the gendered support of right-wing parties.8 This is to say that men who are employed
in more labor-intensive jobs are more likely to feel threatened by globalization and immigration.
However, to build upon their research and explain the gender gap, Spierings and Zaslove focused
on both populist right-wing parties and populism as a larger concept. Using Cas Mudde’s
research, they define populism as a “thin-centered ideology” meaning that populist parties have

Tim Immerzeel et al, “Explaining the Gender Gap in Radical
Right Voting: A Cross-National Investigation in 12 Western European Countries,” Comparative European
Politics 13:2 (2015).
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Prejudice 49:1-2 (2015), 138.
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to depend on other ideologies whether right or left for the content of their platforms and beliefs.9
General populist beliefs, they argue, include a “people-centered” ideology, and emphasis on the
people versus the elites, and high levels of antagonism.10 Their study showed that a gender gap
still existed even between populist right and left parties, with less of a gap in support for populist
left-wing parties.11
Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser mirror Spiering and Zaslove’s definition of
populism. Like Spierings and Zaslove, Mudde and Kaltwasser define populism as a “thincentered ideology,” however, they state that “populist actors do not operate in a cultural or
ideological vacuum.”12 That is to say that the “gendered characterization” of populism depends
on the “cultural setting” and ideological” features to which the populist party adheres to such as
nationalism and nativism.13 Mudde and Kaltwasser also emphasize the fact that right-wing
populist parties operate within “highly emancipated” societies in Northern Europe in terms of
gender.14 Their findings show that in terms of female representation of right-wing populist
parties in national and supranational parliaments is low, and lower than the national average in
many Northern European countries.15 Mudde and Kaltwasser assert that while right-wing
populist parties do not necessarily reject beliefs such as gender equality, views on family policy
are more conservative and traditional. For example, Northern European right-wing populist
parties tend to stress the importance of families and the traditional roles of men and women.16

Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove, “Gender, Populist Attitudes, and Voting: Explaining the Gender Gap
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However, views on gender change in the context of immigration, they argue. Under the threat of
what right-wing populist parties call “Islamization,” the traditional image of women as
“vulnerable” and a “potential victim” is used.17 At the same time, the right-wing’s fight against
immigration and Islamization is expressed as a struggle for Western values. These Western
values stress the “liberal equality of men and women as a national value.”18
Using the scholarly literature on the gender gap and the gendered approach of right-wing
populist parties, my goal is to show how east German male voters share the features of other
populist right-wing voters such as underemployment, unemployment, lack of education and an
overall sense of resentment of elites of the current power structure in the Federal Republic of
Germany. As one AfD voter stated, “[AfD voters] are often citizens who no longer feel
represented.19 With regards to right-wing populist parties' gendered approach, I strive to prove
that the use of the AfD’s strong emphasis on German family values and anti-immigration
platform have further increased the AfD’s appeal to East German men during their crisis of
masculinity.
Ideological Transformation and Leadership Changes of the AfD:
The AfD has not always been a far-right and anti-immigration political party. After the
party’s founding in 2013, the AfD promoted “soft-Euroscepticism,” economic liberalism, and
socially conservative policies.20 Originally, many of the founding members of the AfD were
professors, lawyers, doctors, and former politicians.21 Many of the AfD’s initial members had

Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Vox Populi or vox masculini? Populism and Gender in
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been members of Chancellor Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). According
to Kai Arzheimer and Carl Berning, the AfD’s candidates for the 2013 Bundestag Election were
“more market liberal but no more authoritarian” than their counterparts in the center-right
CDU/CSU.22 However, 2015 represented a watershed moment for party structure and ideological
transformation. The former was the change of party leadership in July 2015, and the latter was
Chancellor Merkel’s suspension of the Dublin Regulation and refugee crisis in September 2015.
In July 2015, Frauke Petry took over party leadership of the AfD from Berndt Lucke, and
under her leadership the party began to become more xenophobic, populist, and radical. Charles
Lees states, “the AfD took advantage of the disconnect between the normally politically astute
Merkel and her core electorate by shifting their own political message away from a technical
critique of the Euro Crisis to a more aggressive attack on immigration.”23 Petry came to power
with the support of the most radical factions of the party, and she even made headlines by saying
that refugees could be shot at the border.24 She was a staunch opponent of Merkel’s refugee
strategy, and the AfD distanced itself from its roots as an economically liberal and softEurosceptic party. However, Frauke Petry stepped down from party leadership before the 2017
Federal Bundestag Election. She was replaced by the “classical liberal” Alice Weidel and the farright leader of Brandenburg’s AfD state party, Alexander Gauland. This new combination shows
that the AfD was aware that its radical and right-wing stance on immigration needed to be paired
with a softer, more market liberal approach at the party’s roots. Weidel and Gauland led the AfD

Kai Arzheimer and Carl C. Berning, “How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to
the Radical Right, 2013-2017,” Electoral Studies 60:102040 (2019), 2.
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to unexpected success in the 2017 election, and solidified the AfD’s role as the far-right populist
voice in Germany.
Far-Right Populism and the AfD’s Supporter Base in the 2017 Federal Bundestag Election:
The AfD’s transformation into an ideologically far-right party could have diminished its
success in the 2017 Federal Bundestag Election. Instead, the party gained 92 seats in the
Bundestag, in spite of receiving less than 5% of the national vote in 2013. Charles Lees asserted,
“the AfD became the third largest party grouping because and not despite the party’s increasing
radicalism.”25 Arzheimer and Berning used the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) to
measure the attitudes of AfD supporters between May 2013 and September 2017. Their findings
show a clear shift in AfD voter attitudes by July 2015. The greatest indicator of support was
favoring a restrictive position on immigration.26 By 2017, an anti-immigration attitude was the
clearest separation between AfD voters and other voters even though it had no discernible effect
in 2013.27 Attitudes favoring higher taxes and more welfare benefits had a weak negative
effect.28 The importance of immigration on AfD voter attitudes clearly shows a shift in the
party’s ideology, and shows that the party now relies on Germans who are more xenophobic than
economically liberal. For example, the 2017 AfD manifesto contains only 3 of 76 pages
dedicated to the Eurozone.29 The party has become the bastion of anti-immigration sentiment,
not economic and Eurozone reform.

Charles Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany:’ The Rise of Right-Wing Populism at the
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25
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The demographic makeup of AfD voters is also necessary to understand its rise in
German politics. Men, especially men from the former GDR, were much more likely to support
the AfD than other voters.30 Also, Catholics were much less likely to vote for the AfD than
Protestants in the east, but Catholics were more likely to vote for the AfD than Protestants in the
west..31 However, Arzheimer and Berning found that non-religious voters were substantially
more likely to support the AfD than religious ones. This could be a result of those in the east
being less religious because of the GDR’s stance on atheism. The AfD appealed to voters (30-44
years of age) more than any other age group.32 These voters had lived most of their lives in a
unified Germany. These Germans demonstrate the disappointments with a reunification favoring
the west.
AfD voters tended to be less educated than other voters. For example, Lees classifies the
three main groups of AfD voters into 3 social groups: Precariat, the respectable middle class, and
traditionalists. The Precariats were the most likely to vote for the AfD.33 Lees defines Precariat
as someone in part-time employment, temporary employment, or unemployed.34 The group of
Precariats are the losers of globalization and reunification. They have witnessed failed promises
since reunification, and they struggle to keep meaningful employment. When paired with the fact
that 35% of AfD voters in 2017 did not vote in the 2013 elections, one can see this frustration
and desire for change in German politics.35

Kai Arzheimer and Carl C. Berning, “How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to
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31
Ibid, 7.
32
Charles Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany:’ The Rise of Right-Wing Populism at the
Heart of Europe,” Politics 38:3 (2018), 304.
30

33

Ibid, 303.
Ibid, 303.
35
Ibid, 302.
34

9
Methodology:
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will focus on factors that drive east German men to
vote for the far-right AfD. I use a more qualitative approach analyzing masculinity in the former
GDR while also using the German Federal Government’s “Annual Report of the Federal
Government on the Status of German Unity, '' and opinion polls from the German think-tank
Allensbach Institute. I also examine how the mass emigration of east Germans and particularly
women contribute to the east German identity as the “loser” of reunification. The chapter ends
with a discussion on how the AfD’s campaigns to appeal to these east German men using antiimmigration strategies. The first chapter serves as the basis to explain why east German men are
dissatisfied with the political, economic, and demographic status quo, and how the AfD uses this
discontent to gain support. With the drivers of the AfD support explained, I then determine that
the AfD were more likely than the other major German political parties to receive support from
east German men in the 2017 Federal Bundestag Election— and future elections— in chapter 2.
The second chapter of the thesis will have a quantitative approach. Using results from the
2017 Federal Bundestag Election, I first compare the male and female proportion of AfD first
and second votes in each of the 16 federal Länder (states) and Berlin. I then compare the
likelihood of an AfD vote in 2017 with the CDU/CSU, Social Democratic Party (SPD), Grüne,
and Die Linke for east German men, east German women, west German men, and west German
women. This quantitative test does more than record past patterns, but it can serve to predict
German voting patterns in future elections. I hope to determine that the AfD’s support among
east German men is disproportionate compared to the other mainstream parties and other
demographic voter bases.

10
Chapter 1: Why Is the AfD So Popular with East German Men?
In this chapter, I hope to find out the factors that drive east Germans, and specifically east
German men, to vote for the far-right AfD. I will examine masculinity, east German identity and
attitudes, possible economic factors and demographic shifts. My goal is to understand why east
German men feel left behind since the reunification of Germany and determine why the party is
so popular in the former GDR. The east German man’s attraction to the AfD lies in their lack of
political and economic opportunities and is further strengthened by the emigration of women out
of east Germany. When paired with the influx of Muslim migrants and perceived west German
domination, the “left-behind” feeling of east German men makes them susceptible to the far-right
ideology of the AfD.
More Than Economics: Economic Realities of the Former GDR
To understand why some east Germans— especially men— feel left behind, one must
first understand the economic realities of east Germany. Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove
determined that uneducated and underemployed men are more likely to vote for populist radical
right parties like the AfD, so grasping the economy of east Germany is key.36 Since reunification
in 1990, the former GDR’s Länder have made great advances in becoming equal to former West
Germany; however, economic growth is still lagging in east German states. In 1991, industrial
production of the former GDR was only 17% of that in the west, but that number increased to
52% by 2016.37 While this growth is very promising, the economic situation in the east is no
Wirtschaftswunder. Overall, the GDP per capita in the former GDR is only 73.2% of the GDP

Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove, “Gendering the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties,” Patterns
of Prejudice 49:1-2 (2015), 138.
37
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per capita in the west in 2017.38 The GDP per capita in western German states was €40,301
compared to just €29,477 in east German states excluding Berlin.39 The poorest east German
state was Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with a GDP per capita of €24,454 while the richest east
German state was Saxony with €28,497. Interestingly, AfD support was the greatest in 2017 with
east German men in the three richest states of the former GDR (Saxony, Thuringia, and
Brandenburg) as discussed later in Chapter 2.40
Unemployment in the east is greater than that in the west. In 2017, unemployment in east
Germany was 7.6% compared to 5.3% in west Germany.41 However, the unemployment rate for
women in east Germany was lower than that for men. 8.1% of men in the former GDR were
unemployed while only 7.0% of women were.42 Those figures were 5.5% and 5.0% in the west
respectively.43 The high unemployment of men could be one factor attracting them to far-right
populist parties like the AfD as scholars like Spierings and Zaslove postulate for other populist
far-right parties.44 In particular, the east German states have a shortage rate for skilled labor. For
example, Thuringia has a skilled labor shortage rate of 81% in 2017.45 The lack of skilled labor
in east Germany means that east Germans workers are not trained and educated enough for many
skilled job positions. This shortage could also explain the striking wage gap between the east and
the west. The average gross monthly wage of a full-time east German employee is only 81% of a

Federal Government Commissioner for the New Federal States, “Annual Report of the Federal
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western full-time employee (€2,690 and €3,330 respectively).46 These economic disparities
between east and west could account for the perceived lack of success of reunification. While
strides have been made in the east German economy, western Germany remains the dominant
force in Germany.
Citizens of east Germany also lack accessibility to positions of power, both economically
and politically, when compared to their western counterparts. There are no east German
companies listed on the DAX-30, the leading stock exchange in the country.47 As Holger
Brandes discusses, western German masculinity and men dominated that masculinity in the east
following reunification as westerners took positions of power from their east counterparts. This
trend continues today. For example, only one in five leadership positions in east Germany are
held by an easterner.48 East Germans hold only 1.7% of the “top jobs in politics, the federal
courts, the military, and business” even though easterners make up 17% of the total German
population.49 The underrepresentation of east Germans further adds to the sense of frustration
and humiliation that they have, especially for men. Economic progress has been made in the east,
but east Germans understandably feel like losers of reunification. Without opportunities to lead,
many east Germans feel like second class citizens. Far-right populist parties like the AfD attract
voters by placing emphasis on the “people vs. the elites.”50 In the case of east Germany, this
strategy is easy because east German men feel dominated and left behind by their counterparts.
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Exodus from the East: Gender Imbalance and an Ageing East Germany
Between 1990 and 2017, 3,681,649 easterners left the former GDR to move to the more
prosperous western states.51 This massive exodus from east Germany since reunification has
caused the former GDR to have a severe demographic crisis that will continue to get worse in the
future. The first major migration occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1989 and 1990,
more than 800,000 people left the east states as factories were closing down, and unemployment
was “skyrocketing.”52 The next series of mass migration occurred in the late 1990s and early
2000s, as many women, young people, and well-educated people left the former GDR to find a
better life in the west.53 These migrations created an aging east German society and a gender
demographic imbalance.
To understand the current demographic and political situation of east Germany, one must
know the history and importance of women’s roles in the GDR, and why women decided to
leave. Before reunification, female employment in East Germany was 91.2%.54 Women in the
GDR held high-standing, and employers were even “obliged to enter into contracts with women,
guaranteeing employment according to qualifications gained during training periods and quotas
were set in all branches of industry.”55 Furthermore, over 90% of women held vocational
qualifications, and there were a high number of women in management posts.56
After reunification in 1990, women's employment in the east began to decline as the new
political and economic systems were implemented in the east. Due to anxiety and

Christian Bangel, Paul Bickle, Elena Erdmann, et al., “The Millions Who Left.” Zeit (2019).
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unemployment, the birth-rate for east Germany dropped by over 60 percent in the first 3 years
following reunification.57 Such a large decline in birth rate is an explaining factor of the growing
divide between men and women in east Germany. The birth rate in east Germany has risen since
to levels exceeding that of the west, but that birth rate is not sufficient to stop the long-term
decline in the rate of annual births.58 Another contributing factor is the migration of women from
east to western Germany. Less women than men came from the west to the east.59 The majority
of women who migrated to western Germany were women between the ages of 18 and 25.60
Current literature suggests that most women are leaving the east due to “deficient employment
opportunities.”61 The differences in education levels have also been posited as possible factors
for migration to the west. Most east Germans have gone to western Germany to receive
vocational training, or go to the less technical focused universities in the west.62
The lack of women in the east could explain the levels of resentment currently found in
the former GDR. East German men possibly look at any new refugees or foreigners as threats to
their already small number of women. Also, once again the domination of west over east is
present. These women have bought into the hegemonic masculinity that Holger Brandes
discusses, and abandoned east German men for “better” opportunities and men in west Germany.
Once again, the identity of the loser east German man is perpetuated, and frustration and
resentment grow.
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The emigration of women and young people from the former GDR also meant that east
German states created less tax revenue which resulted in a breakdown of “social infrastructure,”
which meant that schools, hospitals, and other institutions closed.63 This breakdown of the social
fabric of the east caused many to lose confidence and hope for the future. In a poll conducted by
Emnid, in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, more than one-third of east Germans
felt they were “no longer needed in society.”64 The mentality of easterners as “left-behind” and
forgotten is largely true. Many in the east were, in fact, left behind by their friends and family
that moved to the west.
73 out of the 76 eastern regions lost residents to the west.65 No state has experienced as
much emigration as the city Suhl in the east German state of Thuringia. The city lost more than
38% of its population between 1991 and 2017.66 With east German states and cities like Suhl
losing so many women and young people to the more prosperous west, an ageing population was
inevitable. For example, in 1991, 23.9% of Suhl’s population was under the age of 18. By 2017,
only 12.3% of the population was under the age of 18.67 With east German states and cities like
Suhl losing so many women and young people to the more prosperous west, an ageing
population was inevitable. For example, only 10.5% of Suhl’s citizens were over the age of 65
in 1991.68 However, by 2017, that number had increased to 31.5%.69 Suhl is the perfect
representation of east Germany’s future problems. The Federal Government of Germany projects
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that by 2030 only 51.6% of the east German population will be of working age (18-64).70
Meanwhile, the population of east Germany over the age of 65 is expected to be 31.5%, the same
as Suhl in 2017.71

Figure 1: Percentage of the vote won by AfD compared to Population development between
1991 to 2017 (Source: Zeit, “The Millions Who Left”)
The demographic crisis and emigration have also contributed to the rise of the far-right
AfD in east Germany. The AfD has done particularly well in the regions of east Germany that
experienced some of the highest rates of population loss. As figure 1 shows, cities like Görlitz
that lost 27.3% of residents, voted for the AfD more than regions with less population loss with
32.9% for the AfD. Voting results where there is a stark gender imbalance are also favorable to
the AfD. According to the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Institute of the German Economy),
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there are 9 women for every 10 men in the former GDR.72 The small Saxonian cities of
Chemnitz and Glaubitz there are gender imbalances of 8 women for every 10 men and 1 woman
for every 4 men respectively.73 In 2017, the AfD received 24% of first votes, and 24.3% of
second votes in Chemnitz.74 In Glaubitz, which is in the voting district of Meißen, the AfD
received 31% of first votes and 32.9% of second votes.75 It is clear that the emigration of
easterners has resulted in the rise of far-right voting patterns. The young and well-educated
populations of these cities have been decimated since reunification, and it is understandable why
east German men look for alternatives to their current situation through voting for the AfD.
The East German Identity and the “Second-Class” Citizen
The reunification of Germany resulted in much more than the domination of West
German hegemonic masculinity in the former GDR. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
those in east Germany still struggle to feel “German.” In the 2019 Annual Report of the Federal
Government on the Status of German Unity, 57% of east German citizens said that they felt like
“second-class-citizens.”76 In the same poll, 38% of east German’s said that reunification was a
success while only 20% of those under 40 years of age said reunification was a success.77 This
statistic is particularly important as the AfD was most successful with those aged 30-44 as
discussed in the introduction. While one of this report’s key limitations is that it does not
separate respondents by gender, these findings show that there is disillusionment in east
Germany with both men and women. In response, many east Germans have turned to fringe
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parties like the AfD and even the far-left Die Linke because the mainstream parties such as the
Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) have failed to recognize the east
German frustration.
Other studies also strengthen the assertion that east Germans do not feel like a thriving
population in unified Germany. In a recent study conducted by the German think-tank
Allensbach Institute, many east Germans again made clear they did not feel that reunification
was a success. When asked, “If you look at the developments in East Germany since
Reunification: would you say the economic development is a success or failure?,” only 36% of
east Germans believed that the “Wiedervereinigung,” or reunification, was successful.78 26% of
easterners called the development unsuccessful while 38% were undecided.79 These results
mirror the findings of the Federal Government’s Annual Report on the Status of German Unity.
When asked if east Germany would “develop well in the next few years,” 48% of east Germans
responded “weniger gut/gar nicht gut,” or less well/not well at all.80 These results show that
almost half of the east Germans polled do not have much faith for the future of their economic
development.
The Allensbach Institute also included respondents from AfD supporters in its study.
When asked the question: “The other day someone said: ‘I have a feeling that many others are
getting better and better, but not me. I am one of those who are left behind.’ How do you see
yourself: Do you feel that way or not?,” 40% of AfD supporters answered that they felt leftbehind.81 70% of east German respondents answered the same way.82 These results show that
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many east German AfD supporters felt left-behind by the current government. Whether this
sense of alienation has resulted from economic struggles or migration is not clear, but
dissatisfaction with the status-quo in the east is. The most striking finding by the Allensbach
Institute shows that 62% of eastern AfD supporters feel more “East German” than “German,”
compared to 47% of all east Germans.83 In contrast, 71% of respondents living in former West
Germany identify more as “German” than “West German.”84 Only east German Die Linke
supporters come close to sharing this sentiment with AfD supporters. 59% of east German Die
Linke supporters feel more “East German” than “German.”85 Once again, this finding shows that
both far-right and far-left parties attract east Germans who do not feel fully integrated into the
Federal Republic of Germany. Like the Report on the Status of Germany Unity, the Allensbach
Institute’s findings do not separate the respondents by gender. However, the findings speak to the
sense of east German identity that has formed since reunification.
Faith in the German government and democracy is also lagging in the east. In the former
GDR, 47% of east Germans are dissatisfied with how things are going in Germany, and the
support for Germany’s democracy is not much better.86 Only 55% of east Germans are satisfied
with how Germany’s democracy is working, compared to 66% in west German states.87 The
Federal Government of Germany even recognizes the struggles of democracy stating, “What is
clear is that many in the new federal states, in a similar way to other transformation regions in
the former Soviet Union, have a different view of democracy and market economies to that of
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their compatriots in the west.”88 Those two important cornerstones of Germany have not been as
much of a “success story” in the former GDR.89 This lack of faith in democracy by east Germans
is concerning considering the region’s outlook on the future, and hints that frustration could
continue to grow. East German optimism for the future is lagging behind optimism in the west.
Only 42% of east Germans believe that their children will be “better off” financially than their
parents.90 If this pessimism comes to fruition, leaders in Germany should take notice. If east
Germans continue to feel left-behind, the grip of far-right populism will continue. As long as
these attitudes persist, the AfD will continue to thrive in the former GDR.
Hegemonic Masculinity in East and West Germany
Understanding masculinity in the former GDR is key to gaining insight into why the AfD
is so popular with men from east German states. Before the reunification of Germany occurred,
there were two separate forms of masculinity in the communist East and capitalist West. In
Holger Brandes’ article “Hegemonic Masculinities in East and West Germany (German
Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany)” sets up how these masculinities
compared to one another and competed. These contrasting forms of “hegemonic masculinity” are
key to understanding how east German masculinity has been shaped and dominated. Brandes
defines hegemonic masculinity as “the configuration of gender practice which embodies the
currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is
taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.”91 Brandes
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goes on to describe the hegemonic masculinity of West Germany as one shaped by “transnational
business masculinity” shaped by “increasing egocentrism, very conditional loyalties, and a
declining sense of responsibility for others.”92 This form of masculinity is opposed by the
predominant “proletarian-petty bourgeois lifestyle” in the former GDR.93 That is to say that these
lower middle-class men from the GDR shared a more egalitarian and working class society
unshaped by the likes of a central feminist movement than their richer West German
counterparts. At the same time, masculinity as a social topic in the GDR was “totally
repressed.”94
To shape his assertions, Brandes interviewed men who grew up in the GDR about their
feelings on masculinity. His findings provide insight into how masculinity is viewed in east
Germany, and how this socialization in the GDR shapes attitudes. One of the interviewees, a 26
year old trained forester, stated that “the Westman is maybe more strongly shaped by outside
influences than the Eastman,” and in the GDR “the influential focuses of the man were more the
home of his parents, friends, work collective—uhm, later on your wife and family.”95 While this
man cannot be assumed to be an AfD voter, his assertion that the east is less influenced by global
openness and diversity, shows that this mindset could still be relevant today. The same
interviewee also believes that since reunification German masculinity has become “more
ruthless.”96
The ruthlessness can also be seen in the domination of West German masculinity over its
counterpart in the former GDR since 1990. In 1995, 99.2% of East-West marriages were
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connections between eastern women and western men; also, leadership positions in the former
GDR “in politics, the economy, culture, and science are and continue to be occupied by men who
either come from the West or at least conform to the Western pattern of masculinity.”97 The
continuous marginalization of the so-called “Eastman” in favor of western domination in all
parts of society may hint to the AfD’s popularity with men from the former GDR.
I hope to use Brandes’ findings to show that these attitudes about masculinity still shape
thought in the east today. Brandes demonstrates that the more business-minded and competitive
West German masculinity supplanted the more egalitarian East German one. While his study
focuses on masculinity before reunification, I believe that these core attitudes remain relevant
especially as some east German men now feel like second-class citizens. They must live under
the more open-minded expectations of the new, unified Germany while looking back on their
former masculinity with nostalgia. Even though some east German men— young and old— see
life in the former GDR as far from perfect, it was a time where men felt stability and control. As
east German men see a post-reunification Germany dominated by western values and
masculinity, they yearn for the option to take back control of their own destinies both politically
and economically. Through the AfD, these men have been presented with a political alternative
to their roles as afterthoughts in German society. Now, the east German man does not have to
lose and forfeit their identity.
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East German Men’s Attitudes and the AfD
The attitudes and disillusionment of east Germans with the state of reunification shown in
the Report of the Federal Government on the Status of German Unity and the Allensbach
Institute study clearly demonstrate pessimism and the opportunity for a far-right to fill the void.
However, how have these attitudes actually amounted to growing AfD support among east
German men? As established, many east Germans view the reunification as a failure because of
an unequal economy and political landscape. These factors combined with emigration from the
east and foreign migration into Germany further add to these frustrations. In many ways, these
short fallings of reunification have affected the masculinity and hopes of the men of the former
GDR. One of the AfD’s most prominent and vitriolic members Björn Höcke said, “The big
problem is that Germany and Europe have lost their masculinity. I say: we have to rediscover our
masculinity! Because only when we rediscover our masculinity will we become manly. And only
when we become manly do we become defensive. And we have to be defensive, dear friends!”98
For east German men to regain their masculinity, Höcke suggests that the AfD is the answer. Cas
Mudde believes that there are three reasons that men are more likely to join far-right movements
and parties. The first is that these parties often describe or explain the personal situation that
these men feel.99 That is to say that you are unemployed or single because “others” took your job
or possible spouse. The second is the use of masculinity to “problematize the other” by saying
that they are too effeminate or animalistic.100 This is used through the demonization of Islam by
the AfD. These tools are used to sway male voters to feel like the AfD gives them a voice.
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The sense of frustration among east German men creates a starker image than displayed
in the findings by the Allensbach Institute. Most of this male dissatisfaction centers on
immigration, female companionship, and the economy. One east German man, Frank Dehmel,
stated, “I didn’t risk my skin back then to become a third-class citizen. First there are western
Germans, then there are asylum seekers, then it’s us.”101 This quote mirrors the findings of the
2019 Annual Report of the Federal Government on the Status of German Unity where 47% of
east Germans felt like second-class citizens. Another east German man said, “the Government is
throwing money at refugees, while native pensioners cannot afford a new pair of glasses.”102
While yet another unsatisfied east German man complained, “They have built these pretty
buildings, and yet you still have people sleeping on the streets.”103 Even though the economic
situation of the former GDR has improved since reunification, there is clearly a sense of
dissatisfaction as the safety-net in east Germany has eroded. East German men do not necessarily
miss life in the former GDR, but they miss the sense of economic security that communist state
provided. In the GDR, citizens enjoyed more economic equality than what is present in the more
ruthless, western-dominated reunified Germany. As one east German man stated, “you knew
where you were, you had a good life.”104 Mario Tiesies, another east German man, complained,
“We all gained freedom when the wall came down, but lots of people here lost their economic
security. There is a widespread feeling of distrust, a feeling that plenty of Westerners came here
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just to make easy money.”105 The freedom gained by east German men came at a cost, however.
Freedom meant the loss of stability and the domination of the west.
East German men are also frustrated with their lack of female partners. This threat to
women by women by the “other,” is one of the main drivers of far-right support as Mudde
postulates. When compounded with east Germany’s demographic imbalance, the desire to stem
immigration and xenophobic attitudes are more likely to be present. One member of the far-right
Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization), wrote to Petra Köpping, the integration
minister for Saxony, “if you get me a wife I will stop marching for Pegida.”106 Pegida has had
close ties with the far-right AfD, and held a joint protest march in Chemnitz, Saxony in 2018.
Oliver Klingholz is a 37-year-old east German, who desires to start a family, and find a wife. He
stated that he does not know anyone “who did not vote for the AfD,” and that “it’s hard to meet
someone [a woman] in town.107 He goes on to say that “All they [men] know is that they have
trouble finding a partner.”108 The AfD uses this dissatisfaction with life and love in the former
GDR, and capitalizes on this frustration to attract east German men to vote for the party. By
voting for the AfD, these men feel like they are solving their crisis of masculinity.
The AfD’s Gendered Appeal and Anti-Immigration
The AfD uses anti-immigration and pro-family messaging to appeal to east German men.
However, the AfD is very strong in areas of east Germany that have low numbers of migrants
and people with migrant backgrounds. For example, in Görlitz where the AfD received 32.9% of
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the vote, the foreign-born population is only 3.5%.109 In Meißen, the population is only 2.7%
foreigners.110 Why is there such a fear and resentment of immigrants, especially Muslim
immigrants, in areas that are so heavily German born? This resentment could stem from the fact
that many east Germans do not feel integrated into modern German society themselves. Petra
Köpping says, “People say to me: ‘You and your refugees! You should integrate us first!’”111
She goes on to state that “the way they saw things: there’s money for them but not for us.”112 The
east German people feel left-behind again, this time by refugees.
The AfD also uses certain language to stoke up fears of immigration and Islam. In the
2017 AfD manifesto, the party states, “Islam does not belong to Germany. Its expansion and the
ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed by the AfD as a danger to our
state, our society, and our values.”113 This language demonstrates how the AfD demonizes Islam
as incompatible with German society and culture. For east Germans and especially men, this
fight against Islam is perceived as protecting women both Muslim and German. The AfD writes,
“The headscarf as a political-religious symbol of Muslim women’s submission to men negates
integration efforts, equal rights for women and girls, and the unimpeded development of the
individual.”114 Because the large gender imbalance already exists in east Germany, any threat to
German women is taken even more seriously by east German men.
The AfD’s 2017 manifesto also addresses the role of family and mothers in German
society. The party stresses the role of the family as the bedrock of Germany, and as a way to
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fight population decline and Islamization. The manifesto states, “Greater political support for
parental work, as well as education and family policies which are focused on the needs of
families and young couples wanting to start a family, will once again lead to birth rates at a selfsustaining rate in the medium to long-term.”115 The AfD claims that this strategy will counteract
the current solution of the governing political parties who “support mass immigration, mainly
from Islamic states, without due consideration of the needs and qualifications of the German
labor market.”116 For east German men who want a wife and children, this strategy has to be
effective in garnering votes for the party.
After the success of the AfD in the 2017 Federal Bundestag Election, the party has
introduced a new campaign strategy to attract east German voters. In the 2019 regional elections,
the party used the campaign “Wende 2.0.” The word Wende refers to the peaceful revolution that
brought down the communist GDR.117 This strategy uses grievances against the west since
reunification and the governing CDU to gain votes. Chancellor Merkel and political correctness
have been equated to the former East German secret police, the Stasi.118 Once again, the theme
of western domination over the former GDR can be seen. The AfD perpetuates the victim
identity of east Germans, and in turn, garners massive support from these “left-behind” east
German men.
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Chapter 2: Quantitative Analysis of Voting Patterns in the 2017 Federal Bundestag
Elections
Explanation of German Election System
The 2017 Federal Bundestag Election in Germany was an inflection point for the country.
While Angela Merkel won the Chancellorship for her fourth time, her party, the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), saw declines in its vote share, and her Grand Coalition with the
Social Democrats (SPD) showed signs of weakening. The CDU lost 7.3% of its vote share from
the 2013 Federal Bundestag Election, and the SPD’s vote share decreased by 5.2%.119 There are
many reasons for the decline of Merkel’s Grand Coalition including her decision to accept over
one million refugees in 2015, but the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is perhaps the
most important reason for Chancellor Merkel’s decreasing success. The AfD increased its voter
share greatly compared to the 2013 election. In 2013, the AfD missed the threshold of 5% to
qualify for seats in the Bundestag with only 4.6% of the vote.120 However, by 2017, the party
received 12.6% of the vote, and the AfD became the third largest party in the Bundestag. The
AfD’s success in the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) made the far-right
party the up and coming power player in German politics with 28% of male votes from east
German states. This chapter will discuss how men from the former GDR, in particular, were
much more likely to vote for Germany’s first successful far-right party since the end of World
War II. Throughout this chapter, I refer to east German states and west German states as East
Germany and West Germany. While I know that the GDR (East Germany) and former West
Germany reunified in 1990, the terms “East German” and “West German” are not anachronistic
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in this chapter. The East German states are Thuringia, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Brandenburg, and Saxony-Anhalt.
To fully understand the AfD’s success in the 2017 Bundestag Election, one must first
understand how federal elections work in Germany. German voters cast two votes to elect
members of the Bundestag. Half of the Bundestag’s seats are decided directly by Germany’s 299
constituencies.121 These first votes allow German voters to select individual candidates to
represent their constituencies. The other half of the Bundestag’s seats are decided by second
votes that determine representatives by party lists.122 This second vote is the primary indicator of
party success within the Bundestag because the second vote determines the percentage of seats
given to a party in the Bundestag. The German electoral system combines “first-past-the-post”
and proportional representation, and this process makes the German party's success extremely
measurable.
Comparison of AfD Support between German Men and Women in the 16 Federal German
States and Berlin:
The first section of my chapter will discuss how AfD support in Germany compared
among voters in West German states and East German states. I compared the first and second
votes for the AfD in the 16 federal states of Germany and East and West Berlin. I had to combine
and average the total vote percentages of Berlin because mpachart.net did not have a divided
Berlin. I believe that a demonstration of percentages of AfD support, in terms of first and second
votes, will be helpful to understand the statistical analysis that I perform in the second part of this
chapter. I used mapchart.net to create the maps below. The AfD had the most support in East
German states in terms of male votes. However, women in East German states voted for the far-
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right AfD in higher percentages than men and women in the 2017 Federal Bundestag elections.
The East German states Thuringia and Saxony were the states with the highest percentage of the
AfD votes with men and women. West German states lagged behind with the exception of states
like Bavaria.

Figure 2: Male Ratio of AfD First Votes (Source: Mapchart.net)
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Figure 3: Female Ratio of AfD First Votes (Source: Mapchart.net)
Figures 2 and 3 show the male and female ratios of first AfD votes compared to the 4
other major political parties in this chapter. Among men, the AfD enjoyed the greatest success in
Saxony and Thuringia. In both Saxony and Thuringia, East German men voted for AfD
candidates with over 30%. In Saxony, 34.5% of first votes were cast for the AfD, and in
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Thuringia the AfD received 31.2% of first votes. Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
followed Saxony and Thuringia with 27.4% and 25.9% of first votes respectively. SaxonyAnhalt had the lowest percentage of male first AfD votes in the east; however, the AfD still
received 24.4% of votes. Figure 2 shows that East German men voted in much higher numbers
than other Germans for the AfD in 2017. Even though the AfD enjoyed great success with East
German men in 2017, only 2 Bundestag seats were rewarded through the direct-mandate first
votes.123 The only West German states that had more than 15% of the male AfD vote percentages
are Baden-Württemberg (16.7%), Hesse (15.9%), and Bavaria (15.5%). However, when
compared with Figure 3, it is clear that the AfD had greater success among men than women in
2017.
The AfD received the most first votes among women in Saxony with 22.4% of the vote.
Once again, the AfD enjoyed the second most success in Thuringia with 19.1% of votes. The
other East German states all showed AfD support among women of at least 14%. However,
outside of East Germany, the AfD appears to be much less popular among women. BadenWürttemberg (9.3%), Hesse (9.1%), and Bavaria (8.9%) received the most first votes in West
Germany, but in heavily-populated states like North Rhine-Westphalia and Hamburg the AfD
received as little as 6.5% and 5.6% respectively. Even when compared with their male
counterparts in these states (11.7% and 12.6% respectively), Figure 3 shows that the AfD has
struggled to attract West German women.
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Figure 4: Male Ratio of AfD Second Votes (Source: Mapchart.net)
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Figure 5: Female Ratio of AfD Second Votes (Source: Mapchart.net)
Figures 4 and 5 show the male and female ratio of second AfD votes. These second vote
“Land Lists” gave the AfD 89 seats, making the party the largest non-coalition party in the 19th
German Bundestag.124 The AfD enjoyed the most success in Saxony with 38.8% of second votes
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among men. The massive support in Saxony could be a result of men’s frustration with the stark
demographic imbalance. Thuringia was the other East German state where men voted for the
AfD over 30% with 33.2% of second votes. The AfD also received a large portion of male
second votes in the East German states of Brandenburg (29.9%), Saxony-Anhalt (29.1%), and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (27.3%).
Like the male ratio of first AfD votes, Bavaria (20.0%) and Baden-Württemberg (19.4%)
had the greatest ratio of male second voters in West Germany. However, the AfD enjoyed more
success among second West German male voters than the party did with first votes. In Hesse,
Rhineland Palatinate, West-Berlin, Bremen, North Rhine Westphalia and Saarland the AfD
received at least 15% of male second votes. This finding supports the idea that even West
German men were more likely to use their second votes to voice frustration with Chancellor
Merkel’s Grand Coalition.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the second votes by women were similar to female first votes.
In Saxony, 24.9% of women and 20.1% of women in Thuringia voted for the AfD. Women in
the East German states of Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern cast at
least 15% of their second votes for the AfD with Brandenburg having the largest percentage at
17.0%. However, in West Germany female AfD support still lagged behind that in East
Germany. The highest female AfD second vote ratios in West Germany were Bavaria (10.8%),
Baden-Württemberg (10.7%), and Hesse (10.1%). The AfD received less than 10% of the votes
in the rest of West German states.
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Analyzing the Likelihood of Germans to Vote for the Five Major Parties Based on Gender
and the East/West Divide:
While in the previous section I compared the male and female first and second votes for
the AfD in each of the German Federal States, I will determine the likelihood of Germans to vote
for five of Germany’s major parties based on gender and location in this section. Instead of just
comparing vote percentages, I want to prove that East German men were more likely to vote for
the AfD than any other party or in the 2017 election— especially when compared to other
demographic groups. However, this form of statistical analysis is not simply a record of past
patterns but is also predictive of the future. I chose to compare the AfD with four of Germany’s
largest parties. These parties are the CDU and its sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU)
in Bavaria, SPD, Die Linke (The Left), and Grüne (Greens). I chose Die Linke, in particular, to
see if a populist left-wing party enjoyed success in East Germany, or if the success of the
populist far-right AfD was unique in the East. In order to determine the likelihood of Germans to
vote for certain parties, I performed an Independent-Samples T-Test to discover the differences
in mean in votes in the 2017 Federal Bundestag Elections on SPSS. I used vote totals separated
by gender, Länder (states), and party from the Bundeswahlleiter (The Federal Returning Officer),
and found the ratio of male and female voters per first and second votes over the number of total
votes for these five parties.125 For example, I divided the number of male first votes for the AfD
in Brandenburg by the total number of male votes in Brandenburg, and I repeated this ratio for
all 5 parties and every German state and gender combination, using 1 to represent East and male
respectively, and 0 to represent West and female respectively in SPSS. The Bundeswahlleiter
divided votes in Berlin by Berlin-East and Berlin-West, so I classified Berlin-East as an East
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German state and Berlin-West as a West German state respectively. My findings were that men
from East German states were more likely to vote for the AfD than men and women from West
German states and women from East German states. However, support for the AfD in the east
was still strong.
Table 1: East German Votes vs. West German Votes *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Party

Mean Difference

AfD

0.11475***

CDU/CSU

-0.06477***

SPD

-0.12008***

Die Linke

0.12328***

Grüne

-0.05318***

Table 1 displays the mean difference of votes between East and West Germany for the
AfD, CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Linke and Grüne. The mean difference of 0.11475 (t30.196= 6.923, p <
0.001) shows that East Germans were much more likely to vote for the AfD than their fellow
Germans in the West in the 2017 Bundestag Election. 22.8% of East Germans voted for the AfD
while only 11.3% of West Germans did such. This disparity hints that many East German voters
are unhappy with their straggling living standards and political power. This statistically
significant result is only rivaled by the mean difference of East German Die Linke votes with a
mean difference of 0.12328 (t66 = 11.260, p < 0.001). This result is not surprising, however, as
the far-left Die Linke has great electoral success in the former communist GDR. For example,
Die Linke is the leading party in the regional Thuringian Landtag.126
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The most striking differences between East and West German voters in Table 1 is the
difference in support for the parties of the Grand Coalition, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. East
Germans voted for the CDU and SPD far less than voters in West Germany with respective mean
differences of -0.06477 (t66 = -3.871, p < 0.001) and -0.12008 (t66 = -10.303, p < 0.001). These
large differences between East and West Germany can possibly serve as an explanation for both
mainstream, governing parties losing seats in the Bundestag. The CDU/CSU lost 65 seats
compared to the 2013 Bundestag Election, and the SPD lost 50 seats.127 The environmentalist
Grüne party had a slight disadvantage in the East with a mean difference of -0.05318 (t66 = 5.809, p < 0.001).
Table 2: Federal Male Votes vs. Federal Female Votes *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Party

Mean Difference

AfD

0.08472***

CDU/CSU

-0.06788***

SPD

0.00406

Die Linke

0.00820

Grüne

-0.02911*

Table 2 presents the mean differences between German men and women. The mean
difference between German men and women for the AfD was 0.08472 (t70 = 5.650, p < 0.001).
The AfD received 19.5% of German male votes and 11.1% of German female votes. This mean
difference is closer than I expected; however, when one looks at Figures 2-5, the larger support
for the AfD among men, even in West German states such as Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg,
trailed behind female support in East German states such as Saxony and Thuringia.
127
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The mean difference between male and female votes for the CDU/CSU mirrored the
mean difference of East German and West German votes with a mean difference of -0.06788 (t70
= -4.447, p < 0.001). The mean difference for SPD votes in 2017 equaled 0.00406 (t70 = 0.239, p
= 0.812), meaning SPD support between men and women was essentially the same. However,
this result was not quite as strongly statistically significant. The same can be said for the mean
differences of Die Linke and Grüne. Die Linke had a mean difference of 0.00820 (t70 = 0.488, p
= 0.627), and Grüne had a mean difference of -0.02911 (t70 = -3.035, p = 0.003). These results
show that the greatest and statistically significant difference of this Independent-Samples T-Test
was that of male and female support for the AfD.
Table 3: East German Male Votes vs. East German Female Votes *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p <
0.001
Party

Mean Difference

AfD

0.11690***

CDU/CSU

-0.08605***

SPD

-0.00711

Die Linke

-0.00480

Grüne

-0.01894

In order to correctly prove my hypothesis, I needed to ensure that the AfD support was
greater among East German men than East German women. That is to say that the rise of the farright AfD was not just an East German phenomenon, but an East German male phenomenon.
However, the mean difference displayed in Table 3 establishes this hypothesis. The AfD
received 28.6% of East German male votes, while only 16.9% of East German female votes, and
the mean difference equaled 0.11690 (t22 = 6.034, p < 0.001). This statistically significant result
means that East German men were notably more likely to vote for the AfD than East German
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women. This statistic shows that while men from East German states are the most likely to vote
for the AfD, women from the East German states are still strong supporters of the far-right party.
East German male votes for the CDU/CSU trailed those for the AfD with 27.8% while
East German female votes for the CDU/CSU totaled 36.4%, and the mean difference was 0.08605 (t22 = -3.891, p < 0.001). These mean differences were the only results that were
strongly statistically significant. However, the mean difference for Die Linke is very important.
The mean difference between East German males and East German women equaled -0.00480 (t22
= -0.221, p = 0.827). This result supports Spierings’ and Zaslove’s findings that the gender
voting gap between populist left-wing parties were smaller than the gender gap for populist rightwing parties in Europe.128 Even though East German women showed an inclination to vote for a
left-wing populist party with 22.3% of votes for Die Linke, the anti-immigrant and pro-family
values beliefs of the AfD did not resonate as much.
The support for the center-left SPD lagged in popularity in the East with both men and
women. The SPD only accounted for 16.9% of male votes and 17.6% of female votes with a
statistically insignificant mean difference of -0.00711 (t22 = -0.601, p = 0.554). With only 17.6%
of votes, the SPD barely edged out the far-right AfD with female voters. The lack of support of
mainstream parties like the SPD in 2017, demonstrates the East German voter’s displeasure with
the status quo in the former GDR. Grüne received only 4.9% of East German male votes and
6.8% of East German female votes with a mean difference of -0.01894 (t22 = -1.643, p = 0.115).
This result suggests that Grüne has failed to catch on as a popular choice in East Germany for
both male and female voters.
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Table 4: East German Male Votes vs. West German Male Votes *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p <
0.001
Party

Mean Difference

AfD

0.13936***

CDU/CSU

-0.07866***

SPD

-0.12865***

Die Linke

0.11335***

Grüne

-0.04540***

Table 4 shows the mean differences of East and West German male voters in the 2017
Bundestag Election. 14.7% of West German males voted for the AfD, and the mean difference
between East and West German males equaled 0.13936 (t32 = 10.274, p < 0.001). This result
means that East German males were much more likely to vote for the AfD than their West
German male counterparts. This mean difference signifies that while support for far-right
populism was still popular in West Germany with male voters in 2017, the AfD’s support among
East German men reigns supreme. Spierings’ and Zaslove’s finding that a gender gap in support
for right-wing populism loses its significance when one compares West German men with East
German women.129 As previously stated, East German women voted 17.6% for the AfD.
West German men were also more likely to support the CDU/CSU than East German
men. The CDU/CSU received 35.7% of West German male votes, and the mean difference was 0.07866 (t32 = -3.950, p < 0.001). The two mean differences that rivaled that of the AfD between
East and West male voters were those of SPD and Die Linke. The mean difference for SPD
equaled -0.12865 (t32 = -7.694, p < 0.001), and Die Linke totaled 0.11335 (t32 = 7.464, p <
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0.001). This result suggests that East German men are more likely to vote for a far-left populist
party than a center-left party like the SPD. The disparity in voter support for Grüne was
negligible with a mean difference of -0.04540 (t32 = -4.096, p < 0.001). However, the continued
lack of support shown for Grüne in East Germany with male and female voters suggests the party
would just barely make the seat requirement of 5% if the election was only held in the East with
the environmental party receiving 5.8% of East German votes.
Table 5: East German Male Votes vs. West German Female Votes *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p <
0.001
Party

Mean Difference

AfD

0.20705***

CDU/CSU

-0.13693***

SPD

-0.11862***

Die Linke

0.12841***

Grüne

-0.07990***

Table 5 displays the mean differences between East German males and West German
women. West German women were less likely to vote for the AfD than any other voting group in
Germany. The AfD received 7.9% of West German female votes. The mean difference between
the two groups equaled 0.2075 (t11.925 = 13.069, p < 0.001). However, this result is no surprise as
Figures 3 and 5 show that AfD support was always weakest with female voters in West German
states.
West German women were the most likely voting group to support Chancellor Merkel’s
CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU accrued 41.5% of West German female votes. The mean difference
between East German men and West German women totaled -0.13693 (t32 = -6.897, p < 0.001).
Once again, support for Die Linke was greatest in the East. The mean difference between the two
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groups equaled 0.12841 (t32 = 8.938, p < 0.001) with only 9% of West German women voting for
the far-left party. The mean difference between East German males and West German women
mirrored that of East German males and their Western counterparts, equaling -0.11862 (t32 = 7.231, p < 0.001). West German women also supported Grüne more than any other German voter
group casting 12.9% of votes for the party.
Chapter Conclusions
The findings of this chapter clearly show that East German males supported the AfD
significantly more than East German women or West Germans, and they give statistically
significant validity to my hypothesis. On a state by state basis, the East German states of Saxony
and Thuringia voted the most for the AfD both male and female alike. However, the other three
East German states, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern still ranked
above any West German states in terms of the AfD’s vote share for both genders. One can also
conclude that the large percentages of second votes cast for the AfD in East Germany in 2017
contributed to the party’s massive increase in Bundestag seats when compared to 2013. East
German men even voted in greater number for the AfD (28.6%) than the CDU (27.8%). While
East German women voted in great numbers for the AfD, East German males are clearly the
reason the far-right party enjoyed so much success in the former GDR, and the rise of the AfD is
an East German male phenomenon.
The other major finding of this chapter was the amount of significant support for the farleft populist party Die Linke in East Germany. Both East German males (21.8%) and East
German women (22.3%) voted for the party at higher rates than West Germans. This result
shows that both far-right and far-left populism is very popular in East Germany. This small
gender gap between East German males and females supports Spierings’ and Zaslove’s study
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that showed that the gender gap for left-wing populist parties was smaller than right-wing
populist parties.130 The AfD and Die Linke’s success in East Germany also hints that many East
Germans are dissatisfied with their progress since reunification and Chancellor Merkel’s Grand
Coalition.
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Conclusions
When I started this thesis, I strove to answer why have east German men voted
disproportionately for the AfD, and how does the east German man’s view of masculinity and
dissatisfaction in post-reunification Germany shape this voting pattern. While there is no single
reason why these east German men have looked to the AfD for change, it is clear that many of
these men feel forgotten by their fellow German citizens. East German feel left behind
economically, politically, and demographically. The east German economy has improved since
reunification, but it still lags behind the west. Many of Germany’s top political and economic
positions are dominated by west Germans and west German men. The acceptance of over one
million migrants further exasperated the economic anxiety of the east as many unskilled and
uneducated east German men view these migrants as competition for jobs and women. The
former GDR also faces a demographic crisis. Following reunification, women fled to the west for
better opportunities, and as a result there is a shortage of women and young people in the former
GDR. Many eastern men cannot find romantic partners or start a family. As the losers of
reunification, these east German men have looked to take back their power and identity. They no
longer accept being dominated and forgotten in all spheres of German society.
The AfD has benefitted electorally from the crisis of masculinity in the east. In the 2017
Federal Bundestag Election, the AfD received 28.6% of east German male votes. In states such
as Thuringia and Saxony, this vote total exceeded 30%. East German male voters were more
likely to vote for the AfD than any other party including the governing Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) in 2017— the AfD won a plurality of east German male votes. Overall, the
dissatisfaction with Merkel’s Grand Coalition was even seen among east German women. While
east German women were not as likely to vote for the AfD as east German men, a significant
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number of women voted for the far-party and the far-left Die Linke in the last federal election.
The AfD’s success in 2017 is not an anomaly. The party has campaigned as the main east
German party and given east German men a platform.
With the 2021 Federal Bundestag Election looming, the AfD looks like it is in prime
position to maintain and possibly increase its number of seats in the Bundestag. Chancellor
Angela Merkel is not seeking a new term, and her party is in the midst of a leadership crisis—
largely caused by the AfD party in Thuringia. East German men, who felt left-behind now are at
the center of German politics. These men have found their voice, and through the AfD they can
use that voice to shape Germany for years to come. Their message is clear— east German men
will be forgotten no more.
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